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Abstract: This article aims to provide a detailed analysis of the concept of economic 
dependence and exploitative abuse through their evolution in competition law and 
economics and in European case law. First, while the theoretical roots of these 
concepts may be found in economic theory, we show that the issue has long been 
ignored or only reluctantly considered in competition law enforcement, mainly 
because of a lack of available and reliable economic criteria. Second, although its 
primary objective was to measure market power in an oligopoly context, we examine 
how current empirical industrial organization methodology allows a sophisticated 
measure of the economic dependence among suppliers and distributors. Third, we 
discuss the possibility of relying on the industrial organization approach to address 
these issues. 
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The notion of economic dependence is characterized by a paradox. While its 
theoretical bases are closely related to the notion of exploitative abuse, which was a 
crucial dimension in the European Union (EU)’s competition policy as conceived upon 
its inception, this notion only plays a marginal role – if any – in EU competition law 
enforcement.  
The place of “exploitative abuses” in both case law and the legal literature is also 
reduced to its smallest dimension, even though eminent scholars in EU competition 
law in the 1960s, such as Joliet (1970), attached great importance to these issues. The 
specific case of “abuse of economic dependence” is even more distinctive. While, for 
instance, French, Italian, German, Portuguese, and Greek1 competition laws have 
introduced specific provisions, EU competition law has not.2 The EU concept of 
economic dependence stems from the Court of Justice (CJ) case law. The notion made 
its first appearance in British Leyland3 in 1986, where it was closely related to legal 
monopoly rights granted to a trade partner. Similarly, although the concept has rarely 
been used since British Leyland, its uses in Deutsche Bahn or Aéroports de Paris in 
1997 and 2000 were also related to legal monopoly issues.4 In other words, the 
concept has only been used against firms benefitting from exclusive legal rights, and 
not against firms that had obtained their market position on the merits. In this regard, 
the requirements of EU competition law for characterizing an abuse of an incumbent 
whose market position results from exclusive rights do not involve a demonstration of 
an anticompetitive effect on the market. As a consequence, even though an 
incumbent may be sanctioned, competition law does not provide a test that allows for 
                                                            
1 For the French case, see infra, the Italian case, see Fabbio (2006) and Falce (2015). For the German 
and Portuguese case, see e.g. the OECD’s report (1998, pp.55). For the Greek case, see Truli (2017). 
2 For a comprehensive presentation of the legal provisions related to economic dependence issues, 
see the International Competition Network report published in 2008. 
3 CJEU, C-226/84, British Leyland Public Limited Company vs. Commission, 11 November 1986. 
4 General Court, T-22/94, Deutsche Bahn A.G. vs Commission, 21 October 1997 and T-128/98, 
Aéroports de Paris vs Commission, 12 December 2000. 
 4
the characterization of such an abuse. In market transactions among private 
undertakings, there are no obvious criteria to deal with these types of practices. 
The situation is similar regarding “exploitative abuses.” For instance, in a striking 
opinion issued in the context of a request for a preliminary ruling by the Latvian 
Supreme Court, the Advocate General Nils Wahl stated that such abuses are rightly 
considered with extreme reluctance in EU case law because of the risk of false positive 
decisions. 5 In a market with no barriers to entry, no undertaking may be able to 
maintain extra-competitive prices; according to A. G. Wahl, such a case can only be 
observed in regulated markets. 
The cases of exploitative abuses and abuses of economic dependence may seem 
contradictory in a time of implementation of an effects-based approach. By 
considering their translation into prices, such abuses can lead to mark-up or mark-
down phenomena. The case is rather similar to that of cartel price overcharges, which 
are commonly evaluated for follow-on actions for damages. Competition authorities 
nonetheless seem to privilege a formal approach in these cases, by considering the 
existence of exclusive rights. The present paper questions the tools provided by the 
Industrial Organization (IO) approach in order to address these practices and explain 
this unequal treatment. 
Against this background, this article also addresses whether the economics-based 
approach of competition law can shed some light on the contemporaneous issue of 
economic dependence. This work focuses on the characterization of these abuses and 
does not encompass the issue of remedies (Këllezi, 2008). Similarly, it does not address 
the specific case in which an abuse of economic dependence is exerted by a firm with 
no market power, nor within the context of merger control. For instance, the  
 
                                                            
5 Opinion of the Advocate General Nils Wahl, Case C-177/16, Biedrība ‘Autortiesību un 
komunicēšanās konsultāciju aģentūra – Latvijas Autoru apvienība’ v Konkurences padome, 6 April 2017 
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european Commission took into consideration these types of dimensions in its 
assessment of the Rewe/Meinl merger case.6 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explores the history of 
economic ideas to show that the problem of economic dependence has been 
addressed in different lights with respect to the diversity of economic competition 
theories (Budzinski, 2008). Section 3 investigates how the current IO approach 
provides some instruments that could constitute a standard that competition 
authorities could use within the framework of their current “more-economic 
approach.” Section 4 discusses the possibility of relying on the IO approach to address 
these issues. Section 5 provides a conclusion. 
 
2. IS THE EXERCISE OF ECONOMIC POWER THE TERRA INCOGNITA OR THE 
LOST CONTINENT OF ECONOMICS?  
The first subsection addresses the analysis of abuses of economic dependence (and 
more broadly exploitative ones) in economic theory, while the second one focuses on 
their treatment in EU case law. 
2.1.  Should economic theory address economic dependence? 
The case of the difficulties faced by the French agrifood industry illustrates the 
tensions that can exist between market unbalances and public policies aiming to limit 
farmers’ dependence vis-à-vis processors.7 That there are political pressures to enhance 
the place of competition law to address economic dependence-related issues is not 
surprising considering the history of competition law. If one considers the case of the 
U.S. Sherman Act, the hypothesis advocated by Bork (1966) – according to which the 
                                                            
6 European Commission, Decision 1999/674/EC Rewe/Meinl (1999) OJ L 274/1. See, e.g., Këllezi 
(2008). 
7 For instance, in the conclusions of Estates-General of Food (13 October 2017), French President 
Emmanuel Macron insists on the necessity to rebalance price negotiations between farmers and 
distribution. 
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consumer welfare standard is the sole enforcement criterion – can be challenged with 
regard to legislative history. Indeed, Lande (1989) argues that the political concerns 
raised by undue transfers of wealth among market participants were the main drivers 
of the act. According to this view, the issue was to prevent and to sanction the 
confiscation of economic surplus of the commercial partners of the trusts, a 
confiscation made possible by their economic power. Using the wording of European 
competition law, the situation of the farmers’ economic dependence and the abusive 
exploitation of this situation by the trusts may have motivated the enactment of the 
Sherman Act. However, according to scholars from the Chicago School, the validity of 
the consumer welfare standard is not only grounded in an historical interpretation, 
but is also and mainly based on its administrability with respect to the enforcement of 
competition law. Using this criterion allows decisions to be based on “objective” 
grounds that could be enforceable against third parties. Considering a reasonableness 
test or tackling the issue of economic unbalance leads one to rely on subjective criteria 
that do not eliminate the risk of false positive decisions (Easterbrook, 1982). Quoting 
Becker and Salop (1999), the 2008 Department of Justice (DoJ) report on single firm 
practices stated that in an imperfect and costly information framework, “decision 
theory teaches that optimal legal standards should minimize the inevitable error and 
enforcement costs, considering the probability and the magnitude of harm from 
each.” 
Indeed, the debates around the Sherman Act echo with two of the main difficulties 
encountered by competition law enforcers in characterizing situations of economic 
dependence and in demonstrating exploitative abuse that may affect competition. The 
lack of clear-cut tests or of a consensual counterfactual makes sanctions on the basis 
of competition law difficult. If this type of abuse is seldom or never sanctioned, it is 
mainly because of the impossibility of clearly defining what a fair or a reasonable price 
is. 
The exercise of economic power is not mandatorily a relevant issue for antitrust, 
even though differences can be highlighted between the US and the EU in this regard. 
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There are various reasons that may explain the emergence of a dominant position, 
such as innovation, efficiency, protection, or path dependence. However, while the 
emergence of economic power cannot – and should not – be prevented,8 the abuse of 
an existing power should – and can be sanctioned. In a nutshell, former merits, such 
as past innovations or past efficiency advantages do not justify the use of economic 
power to defend and extend market power or to lobby governments and society 
(Zingales, 2017). The first point echoes with Carlton and Heyer’s view (2008) about 
single firm conduct. While a dominant firm can legitimately extract the surplus created 
by its own merits, the extension of its market dominance on a basis other than on the 
merits (e.g., weakening or eliminating competitive pressure) must be sanctioned by 
antitrust laws.9 The notion of competition on the merits as defined by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Grinnell (1966) provides a means to define what can be seen as 
outside the scope of such competition on the merits.10 In contrast, EU competition 
laws are specific in this respect, considering exploitative prices charged by a dominant 
undertaking to be abusive irrespective of the origins of its market position. 
Implementing competition law resources regarding this issue aims to separate the 
sheep from the goats, e.g. to protect competition but not competitors by avoiding 
                                                            
8 Another example of a competition authority’s scrutiny in the groceries sector is from the French 
agency. It gave an opinion concluding that Parisian market is highly concentrated. It suggests a new 
tool to intervene on market structures: the structural injunction (Autorité de la concurrence, 2012). 
9 The 2008 DoJ report insists on a very relevant distinction to understand the US case law (p.20). The 
DoJ distinguishes market power from monopoly power. Market power is the unilateral capacity to raise 
prices above those that would be charged on a competitive market. Monopoly power is defined as “the 
power to control prices or exclude competition” (see US v E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co (Cellophane), 
351 US 377, 391, 1956). The mere detention of such a power is not sanctioned by antitrust law. It relies 
only on the extension on another basis than on the merits. 
10 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,570–71 (1966). The Grinnell decision is the basis of 
the DoJ 2008 report on Section 2 to define what monopolization is. According to the report, 
monopolization requires i) monopoly power, and ii) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that 
power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business 
acumen, or historic accident (pp.18). 
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decisions that impair consumer welfare. However, the apparent lack of economic tests 
in the current competition law and economics toolbox does not mean that economic 
theory has always disregarded this issue. 
The Chicago School and the concentration of economic power  
If one considers the current situation of competition law and the economics literature, 
and mainly its tools based on the IO literature, one might conclude that abuses of 
economic dependence and exploitative abuses are outside the scope of economics. 
The Chicago School has promoted an effects-based approach grounded on a sole – 
objective and neutral – criterion,11 namely the maximization of consumer welfare. 
Within this framework, efficiency is the only relevant criterion for economic analysis. 
According to Chicago School scholars, the main risk associated with competition law 
enforcement is a “false positive” decision (Easterbrook, 1982). The Chicago approach 
may be characterized by Director and Levi’s analysis (1956) of Judge Learned Hand’s 
1945 ruling in Alcoa. In this margin squeeze case, Judge Hand considered that the 
upstream monopolist should price the input at a level that allows its downstream 
competitor to generate a ‘living profit’. The living profit criterion may be balanced 
against the economic efficiency one. Contrary to Hand, Director and Levi refuse to 
balance efficiency against other social values. 
This rejection of market unbalance concerns as being outside the scope of antitrust 
is symptomatic of a theoretical disdain of market power. The pro-trust antitrust 
orientation of the Chicago School (e.g., Van Horn, 2010) leads to the view that very 
few market practices implemented by dominant firms may lead to anticompetitive 
results or cannot be offset by efficiency gains. In terms of antitrust enforcement, this 
shift has been materialized by the transformation of the treatment of unilateral 
practices, from a presumption of an anticompetitive nature until the 1960s to a 
                                                            
11 Lamadrid de Pablo (2017) sums up this Chicagoan school-based conception as follows: “Unlike the 
concept of fairness (which is typically presented as inherently subjective goal and prone to different and 
ideological interpretations), efficiency has an aura of mathematical objectivity; it is presented as a 
measurable benchmark to assess the economic effects of a given practice, the alternative is discretion.” 
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presumption of lawfulness nowadays. This evolution was symbolized by the DoJ report 
on single firm practices,12 published in the fall of 2008 (and withdrawn by the Obama 
administration in the spring of 2009). Considering the risk (and the social cost) of false 
positive decisions, the DoJ proposed to be more demanding in terms of the standards 
of proof for plaintiffs, knowing that the burden of proof falls upon them. 
This situation contrasts with the 1930s view of the Chicago School concerning 
antitrust enforcement. In particular, the notion that economic dependence is never 
addressed by economic theory, and notably by the Chicago School, is just a distortion 
produced by the shift of economics initiated in the 1950s by the “Second” Chicago 
School. In fact, the “First” Chicago School (and notably Henry C. Simons) considered 
that impairing the concentration of economic power is the primary goal of 
competition law, irrespective of any efficiency matters (Bougette et al., 2015). 
According to Simons (1948), market power allows for the manipulation of prices at 
the expense of the overall society.  
The old institutionalism approach 
This concern was not at that time a novelty in U.S. law and its economics approach. 
For instance, the link between conflicting interests and the role devoted by the legal 
system to finding a reasonable balance can be found in the notion of coercion. 
According to institutionalist scholars, coercion is a basic fact of economic life, as any 
distribution of property rights adversely impacts the bargaining power of economic 
actors. Coercion is the consequence of an unbalance in the economic powers involved 
in a transaction. In this framework, an economic power is defined as the capacity to 
decide unilaterally about price and contract conditions despite conflicts with partners’ 
interests.13 This power to coerce a commercial partner is based on contractual 
                                                            
12 DoJ, (2008), op.cit. 
13 An abuse of economic dependence is possible as soon as the more powerful agent (the one who 
has an alternative) dictates the terms of the relationship by threatening to withdraw from the 
transaction (Emerson, 1962; Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005). 
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freedom14 and on property rights, but, according to the old institutionalists, these 
individual rights may be analyzed as State authorizations to choose from among 
several available courses of action, without regard to the welfare of others (Commons, 
1924). Their enforcement should therefore be monitored by a judge. Therefore, all 
rulings may be analyzed as a compromise among individual rights. 
Consequently, according to this view, conflicts must be settled by the 
(re)assignment of legal rights within society. Judicial decisions lead to a redefinition of 
the scope of choices open to each contractor. For instance, judicial settlements might 
limit the freedom to set prices despite the views of U.S. courts, as expressed for 
instance in Berkey Photo v Eastman Kodak in 1979.15 This decision was taken in a very 
conservative area for the Court, characterized by the dominance of the Classical Legal 
Thought by which contractual freedom and property are seen as fundamental rights. 
An undertaking, even a monopoly, can set its price at any level. This possibility is both 
a legitimate reward for past investments and the driving principle of the self-
regulating nature (according to them) of the market process.16 It remains possible to 
address the issue of excessive pricing through U.S. antitrust laws, even if these prices 
are set by an undertaking whose position was obtained by its own merits. This 
possibility relies on Section 5 of the FTC Act. However, the FTC itself seems reluctant to 
implement this provision in this respect, in view of the risk of appearing as a price 
regulator and consequently being exposed to political pressures in order to cap prices 
in some industries (Baker and Salop, 2015). 
However, Nachbar (2013) shows that the exercise of market power (particularly an 
undue or a not challengeable one) raises two cumulative but distinct issues. The first is 
                                                            
14 According US Supreme Court case law, an undertaking – even a dominant one – can contract at 
the conditions it decides with its commercial partners and can also refuse to deal. See United States v. 
Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 1919. 
15 “[A] pristine monopolist...may charge as high a rate as the market will bear”. Berkey Photo Inc. v 
Eastman Kodak Co.; 603 F.2d 263,297 (2d Cir., 1979) quoted in OECD (2011). 
16 For instance, according to Easterbrook (1982, pp. 2), “judicial errors that tolerate baleful practices 
are self-correcting, while erroneous condemnations are not.” 
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the possible damage in terms of welfare (deadweight loss or consumer welfare 
confiscation). The second is regulatory damage. The private undertaking that benefits 
from market power is able to regulate markets, including at times markets that affect 
public interests. The exercise of market power not only raises concerns in terms of 
efficiency, but also in terms of market regulation. The firm may be able to frame the 
terms of the transactions, as a public regulator can do, and determine market 
dynamics, without any social control. 
2.2. EU competition law remedies for abuses of economic dependence 
How to explain the long-standing reluctance towards abuse of economic dependence 
cases? 
Even if it was rather indirect, the influence of the German Ordoliberal School on EU 
competition law has been stressed in the academic literature (Budzinski, 2008; Giocoli, 
2009). Although this approach may have participated in 1930s neoliberalism, such as 
the Chicagoan approach, there remain significant differences between these two 
schools, especially concerning exploitative abuses (Van Horn, 2010). 
The importance of the efficiency criterion draws a dividing line between the two 
types of neoliberalism. With regard to the Chicago approach, competition law must be 
focused on this unique dimension. On the contrary, in the view of the ordoliberals, 
efficiency should not be considered apart from fairness and equity. Guaranteeing 
equal access to the market, assuring competition on the merits, and preventing 
powerful actors from abusing their economic power constitute one of the underlying 
principles of competition law. The concept of exploitative abuses remains closely 
linked to this concern. Exclusionary abuses reached the top of the agenda in the 
1970s, with the 1973 Court of Justice decision Continental Can. Schweitzer (2008) 
illustrating the tension between these two types of abuse of dominance, both in the 
1957 German competition law and in the Treaty. However, this historical and 
theoretical recognition was not reflected in the case law. 
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The longstanding disregard for exploitative abuses in EU competition law can be 
summed up with two very meaningful observations. The first is related to the 
Commission’s communication of February 2009 related to its enforcement priorities 
concerning art. 102. This text is all the more important in that it constitutes a major 
step in the implementation of its effects-based approach. However, the 
communication only deals with exclusionary abuses, and not with exploitative ones. 
Obviously, the ‘more economic approach’ has nothing to do with exploitative abuses. 
This original type of abuse of a dominant position is no longer a priority in terms of 
competition law enforcement.  
The second observation derives from EC case law. It is possible to find an 
implementation of abuse of economic dependence in the CJ case law, in 1978 outside 
of the perimeter of regulated industries. It was related to the oil industry following the 
1973 crisis. BP was accused of an abuse, to the detriment of one of its customers 
(ABG) due to the shortage of oil product. Despite BP’s market share (26%), the 
Commission considered that art. 102 was applicable. This decision was nevertheless 
annulled by the Court of Justice, on the grounds that the buyer’s economic 
dependence cannot lead by itself to a finding of a dominant position on the relevant 
market.17 
One of the very last uses of the concept of exploitative abuse was made in a 
procedure launched against S&P’s for its abusive practices in the market of financial 
instrument identification numbers.18 The competition concerns (and not the statement 
of objections) communicated by the Commission rely on the mandatory buying by 
firms of additional financial information using these ISIN codes, even if the user does 
not need them. The alleged exploitative abuse was related to this forced sale.  
                                                            
17 ABG/Oil companies operating in the Netherlands, Case n°IV/28.841, Commission Decision of 19 
April 1977 and Court of Justice, Case n°77/77, Benzine en Petroleum Handelsmaatschappij BV and 
others v Commission [1978]. 
18 European Commission, 2011, Standard & Poor’s, COMP/39592, 14 May. 
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However, two remarks should be made here. The first is that the case was settled 
through article 9 of EU Regulation 1/2003, i.e. through a negotiated procedure. The 
case was closed without any decision ruling on the matter, with the Commission only 
needing to accept the commitments proposed by S&P’s. Because of this procedure, 
the Commission did not have to establish a theory of damage, and the defendant did 
not discuss this theory or have to develop an efficiency-based defense. The absence of 
adversarial procedure (in opposition to art. 7 of EU Regulation 1/2003) deprives us of 
any legal discussion or economic tests allowing a full characterization of exploitative 
abuse. The available legal knowledge may be impaired by this relaxation of the 
struggle for law (Wagner-von Papp, 2012). A second point should be highlighted as 
well. We have already noted that the concept of economic dependence has appeared 
in EU case law only against State monopolies. In this precise situation, one cannot 
consider that S&P’s is a State-owned firm operating a network industry, but rather 
that S&P’s has an exclusive legal right to provide these identification numbers for all 
securities issued on the U.S. market. Again, we are far from abuses of economic 
dependence among firms operating on purely private markets. 
The EU Commission’s overcautious approach on exploitative and economic 
dependence abuses echoes the alleged silence of IO on this issue. If it was really the 
case, we may legitimately wonder why economic dependence and exploitative abuses 
have fallen outside the scope of economics. This paradox may be explained by the 
hazards of identifying and remedying exploitation (Lyons, 2008). The EC is reluctant to 
mobilize such theories of abuse because of the difficulties encountered in determining 
how to characterize an unfair price and how to demonstrate harm to competition 
(Akman, 2009). Evans and Padilla (2005) illustrate the risk and the costs of false 
convictions or acquittals that may be induced by flawed decision-making criteria. The 





Are economic dependence cases on the agendas of antitrust enforcers? 
The disappearance of these abuses may be explained by a lack of interest in the 
effects-based approach concerning these issues and by the powerlessness of some 
other theoretical schools to provide clear-cut rules allowing the characterization of 
such practices. Even though old institutionalism has provided an elaborate taxonomy, 
this school of thought has failed to provide a predictive theory of contracts and 
organization and to ground its insights in an empirical research agenda (Williamson, 
1985). At the same time, conventional EU views on competition policies are seen as 
formal, legally based, and at odds with the competition law’s more economic 
approach (Géradin and Petit, 2010), which was introduced in 2009 and which was 
comforted by the Intel ruling of the Court of Justice of September 2017. 19  
The very marginal position occupied by abuse of economic dependence cases in the 
decisional practices of competition authorities may also be explained by a reluctance 
to deal with issues that may be considered to be more linked to contract law than to 
competition law. In a nutshell, an abuse of a dominant position is conditioned on the 
characterization of the dominance in a given relevant market. A horizontal dimension 
is implied, ensuring that consumer welfare is affected by the practice and not only the 
commercial partner involved in the transaction.  
In contrast, at first sight, an abuse of economic dependence involves only a vertical 
relationship between two partners in a value chain. It may not affect any relevant 
markets and only inflicts harm on a given undertaking. In a narrow sense, correcting 
market unbalances is outside the scope of competition law. However, such an abuse 
may indirectly affect consumer welfare. It may induce price increases, impair 
innovation incentives, and ultimately affect the scope of products available to 
consumers. In other words, final consumers may be affected even by such vertical 
practices. However, competition law concerns are also at stake when such abuses may 
                                                            
19 EU Court of Justice, Judgment in Case C-413/14 P/ Intel Corporation Inc. v Commission, 6 
September 2017. 
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impair firms’ capacity to access the market. In this sense, an abuse of economic 
dependence must be sanctioned on a competition law basis since the freedom to 
compete in the market is threatened (Bakhoum, 2015). 
If such a view makes sense in the framework of EU competition law, such a position 
cannot be shared in a Chicagoan conception. The risk of protecting firms (even if they 
are not competitors in a narrow sense) at the expense of consumer welfare cannot be 
avoided. Furthermore, the risk of false positive decisions in terms of consumer welfare 
cannot be eliminated, especially if the standard of proof is relaxed compared to in the 
case of abuse of dominance. Indeed, an abuse of economic dependence does not 
require a characterization of such a position within a given relevant market. 
Furthermore, criticisms raised by the Chicago School against the impressionistic 
area20 of antitrust law enforcement may be once again be addressed, as the consumer 
welfare criterion (conceived here as an objective and clear-cut rule for decision-
making) gives way to fairness and equity considerations. From a legal and economics 
perspective, Kaplow and Shavell (2002) advocate for such a view: “Social decisions 
should be based exclusively on their effects on the welfare of individuals, and, 
accordingly, should not depend on notions of fairness, justice, or cognate concepts.” 
(pp.1) In addition, in a very conservative acceptation of competition law, correcting 
contractual unbalances may impair the competition process itself if uneven economic 
powers are the norm and not the exception on the market. 
                                                            
20 The reference “impressionistic” has been used several times in antitrust case law. For instance, in 
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., “The Court disdains any such effort today. Untroubled by the 
language of §7, its legislative history, and the cases construing either that section or any other provision 
of the antitrust laws, the Court grounds its conclusion solely on the impressionistic assertion that the 
Los Angeles retail food industry is becoming “concentrated” because the number of single store 




In a strict Chicagoan perspective, taking into consideration such concerns may lead 
competition law enforcement to turn away from an “economic-oriented approach” 
(based on the consumer welfare criterion) towards a “social-oriented” one that aspires 
to balance efficiency concerns with fairness related ones (Bakhoum, 2015). Such a 
view may be too restrictive, considering both U.S. and European competition law 
histories. In the European sense, the notion of a special duty of a dominant firm 
towards the preservation of an effective competition structure shows that an abuse 
may be characterized even without a demonstration of consumer harm in terms of 
welfare. In the U.S. case, the enactment of the 1890 antitrust law cannot be 
understood without a reference to the issue of the concentration of economic power.  
In this perspective, “the concentration of economic powers in the hand of private 
economic entities affects not only the structure of the market, but also the individual 
freedoms of market participants,” as stated by Bakhoum (2015, p.21). In the 
conventional EU perspective, guaranteeing market access cannot be seen as a non-
economic goal of antitrust that can be criticized considering an induced trade-off with 
economic efficiency. The freedom to access the market is considered as a necessary 
condition for efficiency.  
However, taking these risks into consideration does not lead to a consensus. 
A first set of opposing arguments is closely linked to Chicagoan views, especially to 
the error-cost framework and to that of antitrust modesty. The standard of proof is 
seen as far weaker than that imposed by the effects-based approach. This 
characteristic may lead to decisions that are not sufficiently grounded in sound 
economic analysis. The uncertainty about the theory of competitive damage may also 
lead to inappropriate remedies21 that may harm consumers (Lianos and Lombardi, 
2016). At the same time, correcting the contracting disequilibria among commercial 
                                                            
21 For instance, retailers may be seen as gatekeepers in order to access the market, leading to queries 
to activate the essential facilities doctrine (Chauve and Renckens, 2015). Controlling an essential facility 
may be considered the last stage in terms of exerting coercive power on its commercial partners, as they 
do not dispose of any alternative.  
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partners in a vertical value chain implies that competition authorities perform a trade-
off between fairness-related concerns and economic efficiency. Since there is no way 
to balance these conflicting objectives, the risk is to offer excessive room for judges’ 
discretion.22 
A second set of arguments is related to the assessment of the actual level of 
competitive damage that is induced for final consumers by this unbalanced market 
power. We have already pointed out the three channels by which consumer welfare 
may be impaired: i) increased prices, ii) reduced choices, and iii) limited innovation 
incentives. These causal links have been challenged by recent assessments performed 
by the European Central Bank and by the EU Commission. For example, one study has 
cast doubt on the impact of an increased concentration at the retailing level on prices 
paid by final consumers (Ciapanna and Rondinelli, 2014). In the same way, the EU 
Commission report on modern retail (2014) challenges the adverse consequences of 
retailers’ concentrations on consumers’ spans of choices and on incentives to innovate 
for producers.23 
After analyzing the concept of economic dependence through the lens of the 
history of economic ideas, we will show how modern industrial economics (i.e., the 
Post-Chicago School or IO – see, e.g., Budzinski, 2011) has been able to provide both 
theoretical and empirical tools to measure economic dependence in the sense of buyer 
power and bargaining power. 
                                                            
22 See, for instance, the views according to which integrating other dimensions than consumer 
welfare in competition law enforcement may lead to “political economy considerations” and to a 
“holistic” competition law model (Lianos and Lombardi, 2016, p.25). 
23 One may also note that short-term and long-term effects on consumer welfare may be different 
and that the three criteria (price, choice, and innovation) may evolve in opposite directions. A pressure 
on prices exerted by retailers may have adverse effects on the range of the producer’s offer in terms of 
products and on its capacity to finance R&D. The assessment of the net effect depends on the 
theoretical framework adopted in terms of competition intensity and incentives to innovate. To 
illustrate, see, e.g., the inverted-U relationship crafted by Aghion et al. (2005). 
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3. HOW DOES MODERN IO PROVIDE TOOLS TO ADDRESS EXPLOITATIVE ABUSE 
CASES? 
Modern IO analyzes the concept of economic dependence through the lens of a 
vertical industry framework.24 Indeed, dependence may be explained by an imbalance 
in the contractual relationship between a producer and a retailer. While a structural 
approach introduces this imbalance with a cost asymmetry among suppliers and 
retailers, a bargaining approach investigates how large firms may have greater 
bargaining power than small firms in oligopolistic input markets. We focus on the 
agricultural and food sectors to illustrate our point. 
3.1. Theoretical approaches to address economic dependence 
Oligopoly vs. oligopsony problems 
The structural imbalance stems from two different sources. When there are few 
suppliers and many buyers, the so-called oligopoly problem arises (see, e.g., 
Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010). The vast majority of strategic analyses of imperfect 
competition lies in this first version of imbalance. Market power may be found both at 
the upstream (concentration of producers) and downstream (concentration of 
retailers) levels of markets. The second source of structural imbalance, which is less 
prevalent in the literature, refers to the oligopsony problem – a situation in which 
there are few buyers in the market (retailers in this case) and a large number of 
suppliers (producers). In this latter case, a situation of economic dependence may 
emerge. Table 1 summarizes the different configurations and the types of market 





24 For a discussion on the benefits and limits of modern IO to competition policy, see Budzinski (2011). 
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TABLE 1: ASYMMETRIC MARKET STRUCTURE 
 Upstream Downstream 
Bargaining power 
Few sellers Many buyers 
(oligopoly problem: retailers face powerful suppliers) 
Many sellers Few buyers 
(oligopsony problem: suppliers face powerful retailers) 
 
Specificities of the agrifood sector 
Rogers and Sexton (1994) identify specific structural features in the food sector. First, 
products are often perishable. They are difficult and costly to store and transport. 
Packing facilities or processors (cf. infra) are located in geographic proximity to farms 
and may therefore exhibit buyer power over farms located in their vicinity. Second, in 
many cases, an intermediary between producers and distributors appears, such as 
processors (e.g., slaughterhouses for meat products). These intermediates are very 
specialized and may exercise significant market power, ultimately leading to a triple 
margin on products along the value chain. Third, producers such as farmers need 
specific assets and thus face high sunk costs. Barriers to entry in such sectors are 
relatively strong. Finally, new players have emerged to counterbalance the bargaining 
power in place. For example, purchasing cooperatives or associations of producers 
have emerged, which can pose their own problems in terms of competition. These 
four characteristics, Rogers and Sexton (1994) argue, justify the intervention of public 
authorities to promote competition in the upstream industry and to develop means of 
countervailing powers. 
Processors play a role as gatekeepers and may also enjoy significant market power. 
These vertical dimensions require an analysis in terms of the global value chain (De 
Baker and Miroudot, 2014). Within this perspective, also developed by Lianos and 
Lombardi (2016), the vertical relationship between producers and retailers can be split 
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into several situations, distinguishing for instance market-based models of 
governance, relational markets, and captive ones. The last model is the most relevant 
for our analysis. Contrary to a relational model, the relationship between the producer 
and the retailer (which has undertaken specific investments) is very precarious and 
may be regularly called into question. The importance of criteria as to the origins of 
the dependence and the requirements in terms of compulsory notice and the stand-
still periods prior to putting an end to the relationship (see Vogel (2016) for examples 
from distribution agreements) might be explained in such a framework. According to 
Vogel (2016), the challenge is to separate legitimate competition law enforcement 
from the incorporation of concerns based on the requirements of contractual 
protectionism.  
Buyer power through bargaining power 
Returning to Table 1, the buyer power that results from oligopsony is a first theoretical 
key for modeling economic dependence (we will see empirical evidence below). A 
precise definition of buyer power corresponds to the capacity of firms to reduce their 
demand aiming to lower prices for their inputs. This market configuration does not 
result systematically in an anti-competitive outcome. Indeed, pro-competitive effects 
are present whenever upstream competition is weak. 
Another strand of the economic literature refers to vertical bargaining games. The 
joint negotiation of price and quantity (which may also include other terms in the 
contract) is modeled with bilateral Nash-bargaining between manufacturers and 
retailers (see first paper by Horn & Wolinsky, 1988). For instance, an input supplier 
negotiates with a downstream producer. If an agreement is reached on a market, a 
fixed benefit of cooperation is divided between the negotiating parties. In such a 
framework, Chae and Heidhues (2004) analyzed buyers’ incentives to form alliances 
among small and medium-sized firms. 
With respect to vertical bargaining, a growing body of literature has emerged that 
analyzes the effects of buyer power on prices and welfare (von Ungern-Sternberg, 
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1996; Dobson and Waterson, 1997; Inderst & Wey, 2007). This literature shows the 
existence of countervailing power in terms of lower input prices. This is in line with 
John Kenneth Galbraith’s work, which was the first to address the countervailing 
power hypothesis. “In the typical modern market of few sellers, the active restraint [on 
the exercise of private economic power] is provided not by competitors but from the 
other side of the market by strong buyers,” Galbraith wrote in 1952. To benefit 
consumers and improve welfare, buyer power needs strong competition in the 
downstream retail market. Therefore, a decrease in the number of retailers has 
beneficial effects for consumers, since larger retailers can extract lower prices from 
their suppliers. Unlike previous papers that assume a linear form of demand, Gaudin 
(2017) shows that countervailing buyer power arises in equilibrium for a broad class of 
demand forms, and its magnitude depends on the degree of product differentiation. 
In addition, buyer power may also strengthen suppliers’ incentives to invest in 
capacities or to adopt new technologies with lower marginal costs. 
Chen et al. (2016) show that buyer power and downstream competition can be 
viewed in fact as substitutes for one another. They model downstream competition 
with only one large retailer. Consumer welfare improves following an increase in the 
buyer power of the large retailer. Increased competition among retailers forces the 
large retailer to bargain harder with its supplier to obtain a lower input price, which 
reduces retail prices even further. In addition, Mérel and Sexton (2017) show that 
entry into the input market and social welfare are more likely to increase with a 
greater extent of concentration in the downstream market. The more inelastic the 
supply of the input, the more elastic the demand for the output produced from that 
input, and the greater the ex-ante degree of concentration in the industry. Agricultural 
product markets often represent such settings.  
What if retailers are merging? Assuming that retailers are local monopolists 
operating in separate markets, Inderst and Wey (2003, 2007) show that a downstream 
merger will increase upstream firms’ incentives to reduce their marginal costs. 
Asymmetries between retailers, with some large buyers and some smaller ones being 
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simultaneously active and facing different input prices, may lead to a “waterbed 
effect” (Inderst and Valetti, 2011). If a large firm exercises its bargaining power, the 
terms for its competitors may be deteriorated enough so as to eventually increase the 
average retail price, which in the end harms consumers.25 
A more flexible alternative to merging is to form an alliance. Caprice and Rey (2015) 
study precisely the effects of forming buying alliances.26 Downstream firms enhance 
their collective bargaining position at the expense of their suppliers. With regard to 
retailers, two advantages stem from this “alliance strategy.” First, firms benefit from 
associated economies of scale. Second, they can make a joint delisting decision (i.e., 
removing goods from the shelves). Such a delisting threat significantly increases their 
bargaining power, and in fact retailers do use delisting as a bargaining strategy: the 
risk of a manufacturer going bankrupt if delisted by a large supermarket is real. 
Caprice and Rey (2015) show that joint delisting decisions increase the bargaining 
position of a group’s members.27 This better bargaining position may place suppliers in 
a position of economic dependence, and does not favor consumers since delisting 
decisions do not necessarily lead to lower retail prices. Florez-Acosta and Herrera-
Araujo (2017) examine empirically the effects of product delisting on consumer 
shopping behavior when consumers may source multiple stores. Based on scanner 
data on grocery purchases by French households in 2005, their results mitigate the use 
                                                            
25 See Allain et al. (2017) for empirical evidence of increased prices following mergers in the French 
grocery retail sector. These theoretical insights are challenged by the results of the EU Commission 
Modern Retail enquiry (EU Commission, 2014). Actually, the concentration level in the retail industry is 
mitigated by considering the difference between the concentration at the level of the relevant national 
market and the concentration at the local retail market. In addition, the Commission highlights that the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) has actually decreased in 16 out of the 26 Member States studied.  
26 For further details on the French case, see the 2015 opinion of the French Autorité de la 
concurrence, Avis n°15-A-06 du 31 mars 2015 relatif au rapprochement des centrales d’achat et de 
référencement dans le secteur de la grande distribution. 
27 For a survey of different buyer power abuses and their effects on suppliers, see the report of 
Nicholson and Young (2012, p.6). Threats of de-listing constitute an abuse among others. Large 
retailers may also ask for slotting fees, retrospective discounts, or after-sale rebates. 
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of delisting as a credible strategy. They show that delisting a product when costumers 
are loyal to the brand can be detrimental not only for the manufacturer, but also for 
the supermarket. If consumers can readily find an alternative store supplying the 
missing product, the retailer will possibly suffer the most from its own strategic 
decision. 
3.2.  How to assess economic dependence? 
The risk rate as a first screen  
Given the contractual structure, the first instrument to measure economic dependence 
is the risk rate. For a given retailer, the risk rate is defined as the share of its turnover 
related to the distribution of a product by an upstream producer. The higher the risk 
rate, the more it will jeopardize that producer’s viability in the event of a breach of 
contract. Indeed, the producer will be economically dependent since it may have 
trouble switching from one retailer to another, particularly in the case of large orders.  
In French competition law, two conditions need to be met in order to characterize a 
situation as one of economic dependence: i) the supplier’s production factors cannot 
be used or adapted for the production of other goods at an economically acceptable 
cost; (ii) for a given supplier, there are no other comparable retailers for the goods it 
offers. Additional demand from other retailers amounts to a small share of this 
supplier’s demand, which does not allow the covering of costs. These criteria refer to 
capacity investments that suppliers are required to make for supply distributors.  
A definition of economic dependence of an independent supplier with respect to 
one retailer can use the concept of specific assets (Williamson, 1985). The criterion for 
economic dependence is the redeployable nature of the technology for another 
product or volume, or for an order from another client. Independent suppliers invest 
in order to have the ability to supply large distributors. When it is designed as part of 
a bilateral contractual relationship, this investment exposes the supplier to 
opportunism from the retailer who can exploit an addiction introduced by mutual 
specific assets. 
 24
This risk rate is also called the threat rate.28 For any supplier, it is then possible to 
calculate a series of risk rates. As with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in merger 
control, the use of the risk rate allows for a first screen to detect and justify situations 
of economic dependency. It cannot, however, grasp the complexity of the different 
contractual situations and the industry dynamics. Delors (2007) uses the above 
methodology to analyze the possible economic dependence of SMEs, particularly 
when they produce private label products for large retailers. In this case, the majority 
of such products are poorly differentiated with a weak innovative element, which 
makes suppliers’ bargaining power relatively small. 
Delors (2007) evaluated economic dependence by looking at the diversification of 
outlets of independent suppliers. Their database was composed of 942 private label 
French products from the year 2004. The data limitations included the impossibility of 
assessing alternative technical and commercial solutions and the calculation of costs 
and time to find a new retailer. Thus, the evaluation of economic dependence was 
focused on the outlets’ diversification of independent suppliers. The variety of outlets 
provides an indicator of SME economic dependence that is reduced when each 
contract occupies a smaller share in the independent supplier’s turnover. The results 
show that in terms of the number of contracts, independent suppliers are mainly in a 
strategy of outlet diversification, which should protect them from economic 
dependence. 
Testing oligopsony power 
In early 1980s, the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) approach, pioneered 
by Appelbaum (1982), Bresnahan (1982), and Lau (1982), tried to assess the degree of 
market power of a specific industry on the output market under specific assumptions 
regarding demand, cost functions, and strategic interactions among firms. An index 
close to the weighted Lerner index was assessed in certain industries. The first studies 
                                                            
28 The notion of threat points allows the different parties to the transaction to find a best alternative 
to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) and was used by the Bundeskartellamt (2014) in its study on the 
food retail sector to assess bargaining power. 
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concerned oligopoly settings. Empirical work then emerged on oligopsony power in 
the retail food industry. To mention just a few: Just & Chern, 1980 (tomatoes); Love & 
Murniningtyas, 1992 (wheat); Wann & Sexton, 1992 (pears); Cakir & Balagtas, 2012 
(milk). Most empirical work shows some presence of oligopsony power.29 
Gohin and Guyomard (2000) were the first to apply NEIO methods to the retail 
grocery sector, focusing on food products, namely dairy products and meat products. 
Based on the assumption of quantity competition, they found that French food 
retailers do not behave competitively. Furthermore, they show that more than 17% of 
the wholesale-to-retail price margins for dairy and meat products can be clearly 
attributed to oligopoly-oligopsony distortions. Another study stressing the specificities 
of the agrifood sector is Richards et al. (2001). They analyzed the frozen potato 
processing market in Washington DC and showed that potato processors behave as an 
oligopsony in acquiring raw potato stock. Furthermore, “processors are able to collude 
and offer potato prices below the competitive level and, somewhat perversely, 
suggest that the bargaining process may indeed be a facilitating mechanism for this 
collusion” (Richards et al., 2001, pp. 269). The presence of the oligopsony-colluding 
market structure for processors reduced the growers’ surplus by approximately 1.6% 
of market revenue per month.  
Competition authorities have been also interested in assessing market power in the 
grocery retail sector. In 2008, the UK Competition Commission launched the ‘Groceries 
Market Investigation.’ The authority analyzed prices negotiated between supermarkets 
and suppliers. They found that buyer power is absent for branded products, where 
there is a single supplier, but that it is present for private label products, where 
                                                            
29 A technical and thorough survey of market power estimation is beyond the scope of the present 
article. See, for instance, Perloff et al. (2007), who present the different approaches for modeling and 
assessing market power. 
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suppliers compete. What matters is the combination of buyer size and the choice of 
suppliers, rather than buyer size alone (Davis and Reilly, 2010).30 
 
4. IS THE EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH APPROPRIATE FOR CHALLENGING ABUSES 
OF ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE? 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, economics and more particularly IO gives 
insights into abuses of exploitative and economic dependence. Some economic tests 
are available to help plaintiffs provide evidence of such abuse or to ensure conviction 
by a judge. However, one may wonder whether this logic of effects-based tests is 
really sufficient to tackle this issue. The main points to consider are whether there are 
clear-cut decision-making criteria to define such abuses, the trade-offs between per se 
rules that may lead to false positive judgments, and the role of reason-based 
approaches that may lead to false negative judgments. 
We first assess to what extent competition authorities are reluctant to sanction this 
type of abuse. Second, we detail the reasons for which economic unbalances can be 
within the scope of competition policy. 
4.1. Why competition authorities may be reluctant to sanction this type of 
abuse 
IO models demonstrate that vertical restrictions may have horizontal consequences 
on downstream markets. It is not only a question of wealth transfer among vertically-
related undertakings, but is also an issue of consumer welfare. The impacts of such 
exploitations of economic power can be defined in terms of mark-ups (oligopoly 
power) or mark-downs (oligopsony problem). There is no difference in terms of 
economic tools with the calculation of cartel price overcharges. This last type of 
                                                            
30 Another example of scrutiny by a competition authority in the grocery sector is from the French 
competition agency, which gave an opinion concluding that the Parisian market is highly concentrated. 
The authority proposes a new instrument to intervene on market structures, i.e. the structural injunction 
(Autorité de la concurrence, 2012). 
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economic evaluation plays, nevertheless, an essential role in the private enforcement 
promoted by the EC. With regard to theoretical questions, there is no more of a risk of 
false positives or over-enforcement for exploitative abuses than is the case with 
follow-on suits seeking compensation for competitive damages. 
However, the reluctance to implement the provision of Art. 102 and the 
confinement of abuse of economic dependence cases in Member State legislation to 
the field of restrictive practices should be questioned. 
A first explanation may rely on a common feature that characterizes the entire 
effects-based approach. In Nicola Giocoli’s words, this is an Old Lady Charm (Giocoli, 
2015). Despite the rise of IO models for more than thirty years now, the old-style 
Chicagoan models still rule the economic assessment of market practices in antitrust 
rulings. If the Chicagoan models have shown themselves to be as strong as ever, it is 
mainly because they readily provide clear-cut assessments regarding the compliance of 
a market strategy with competition law. Competition authorities rely not only on 
economic expertise to assess the impact of a given practice on a market, but also on 
economic reasoning in order to explain a firm’s strategy in the market and to assess if 
it is participating from a logic of competition on the merits. It is not an issue of 
substituting the consumer welfare test with the no economic sense test (Werden, 
2006), it is just a recognition that the first step in the economic treatment of a 
competition case is to assess the plausibility of an anticompetitive explanation for the 
market practice. The assessment of its consequences in terms of consumer welfare is 
implemented only in a second step, mainly to assess a possible efficiency-gains based 
defense or to evaluate the adequate amount of a fine. 
In such a context, IO models may be disregarded, as they rely on what Fisher 
(1989) defines as an exemplifying theory. They propose a case-by-case analysis of a 
market practice, mainly based on game-theoretical approaches. As their results are 
dependent on their hypothesis or their chosen parameters, they can be considered 
cautiously by judges. While they are indubitably dominant in the economic theory 
field, they may appear to be too contingent to win the day in the case law. In other 
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words, the idiosyncratic nature of these models makes them more ready for 
classrooms than for courtrooms. It is not only a question of the complexity of the 
involved economic reasoning (Baye and Wright, 2011), it is also an issue of the 
robustness of the judicial adjudication. The main risk for a judge is to see his or her 
decision overturned by an appeals court. Economic expertise plays a different role in 
antitrust cases than the role played by medical or technical expertise in other types of 
litigation. Its judgment in terms of efficiency determines the decision itself. Therefore, 
an ‘it depends on circumstances’ conclusion may lead to a rejection of the model, just 
because of the judicial uncertainty that it creates. In addition, in a controversial 
procedure each side may select, from the range of available models, the one that is 
most favorable to their strategy and may perform a fine tuning of the parameters in 
order to support their position. Such cherry-picking strategies may enhance a judge’s 
distrust towards this kind of model. As Werden (2008) states, “economics has no well-
established standards governing the selection and application of particular models and 
methods.” 
The highly assumption-sensitive nature of IO models and the failure of economists 
to provide courts with a method to select from among competing models may lead 
U.S. courts to reject economic expertise on the basis of the Daubert criteria31, 
according to which expert testimony must be “relevant” and “reliable” (Giocoli, 2017). 
A second explanation is the following. Competition authorities are all the more 
reluctant to sanction these types of abuses in that they appear to be mainly related to 
welfare transfer issues and not to efficiency ones. As seen above, according to the 
Chicago School’s logic, issues of welfare transfer remain outside the scope of 
economic theory. Considering any other purposes may create a margin of discretion 
for the judge, allowing him or her to rely on them in a discretionary way. Again, it is 
not only an issue of taking into consideration the risk that a given judge may promote 
his or her own values or preferences, but is mainly a risk of seeing a ruling superseded 
in the appeals process. 
                                                            
31 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 US 579 (1993). 
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4.2. Why economic unbalances can be within the scope of competition policy 
The separation between efficiency and wealth distribution is not so obvious.  
First, if one considers legal and economic history, the origin of U.S. antitrust law 
does not correspond to Bork’s view. Lande (1989) demonstrated that undue wealth 
transfers resulting from unbalanced market powers were the main drivers of its 
enactment. The 2nd industrial revolution trusts did not raise concerns in terms of 
production efficiency. Political pressure and theoretical debates (if one considers the 
case of the old institutionalist scholars) were mainly focused on the exercise of 
coercive powers in transactions. The issue of economic power was not limited to 
consumer harm. It was also related to the capacity that economic power may provide 
in terms of framing economic transactions, constraining the economic strategies of 
counterparts, or unilaterally deciding prices, investments, etc. An unconstrained 
exercise of private economic power may induce a regulatory harm that is distinct from 
the welfare harm in itself (Nachbar, 2013). Such a consideration may be linked to the 
current legal and economic literature, which considers economic power to be an issue 
in and of itself (Kahn and Vaheesan, 2017). Such a conception echoes with ordoliberal 
views, according to which the concentration of economic power is the main issue of 
competition law, but as noted earlier is at odds with the Chicagoan analysis. The 
concentration of economic power raises no concerns since the market is not protected 
by barriers to entry. Such barriers cannot be technological or financial, they may only 
be regulatory. The opinion of AG Wahl quoted in our first section must be read in this 
context: there is no possibility of exploitative abuse in a market that is not protected 
by exclusive rights. 
Second, IO models show that restrictive vertical practices cannot be considered to 
be neutral in terms of consumer welfare. A vertical distortion has an impact on 
horizontal competition. In this respect, competition laws allow vertical contractual 
unbalances to be taken into consideration. In addition, the concentration of economic 
power may have a significant impact on welfare. For instance, empirical studies 
performed on U.S. data has demonstrated that mark-ups decreased from the 1950s 
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until the early 1980s and started to rise thereafter (De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2017). In 
2014, the higher the market share of an undertaking was, the higher were its mark-
ups. It was the contrary in the early 1980s. Over the last 35 years, the mark-up 
increase represented a yearly rise in final consumer prices of 1%. This increased market 
power has allowed the productivity gains (3 to 4% per year) to be bypassed in terms 
of lower prices. This has led to wealth transfers between consumers and firms that 
may cause macroeconomic unbalances, as Piketty (2014) and Kahn and Vaheesan 
(2017) have stressed. Interestingly, these were already seen as an inducer of the 1929 
Great Depression by Harberger (1954). 
Therefore, antitrust law enforcers must consider the issue of the concentration of 
economic power and its exercise as a relevant issue for competition law. As the 
ordoliberal scholars have stated, competition law must protect the competitive 
process in itself and for itself. This protection may be relevant even though there is no 
clear direct impact on consumer welfare. The notion originating in EC case law of the 
dominant undertaking’s special responsibility regarding the maintenance of a 
structure of effective competition can be re-assessed in view of this issue.  
It follows from the above that the responses of competition law enforcement to 
exploitative abuses or abuses of economic dependence positions must not be limited 
to these strictly efficiency-related considerations. Such practices may compromise 
consumer welfare in the long run by impairing the access to market for current and 
potential competitors.32 Meanwhile, the exercise of such powers conflicts with the 
underlying principles of competition law, i.e. the principle of free and undistorted 
competition based on the merits. As a consequence, such abuses must be sanctioned 
                                                            
32 One may weigh short-term and long-term antitrust concerns, to balance a tradeoff between static 
and dynamic efficiency. The French National Assembly 2016 proposal of a law concerning the abuse of 
economic dependence illustrates this tradeoff. The proposal tends to require the Autorité de la 
concurrence (the French competition authority) to consider the consequences of such abuses not only in 
the short term but also in the medium one. One may also consider that in the long run abusive 
strategies lead to an erosion of the “moral of the market” and may produce a loss of faith within 
society regarding the acceptance of markets and competition as coordination mechanisms. 
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not only through restrictive practice provisions (which do not request an assessment 
of the effects on consumer welfare, as underlined above). It should also be, and it can 
be, sanctioned through Article 102 of the Treaty. Competition laws that protect 
competition order have something to say about contractual unbalances not only on 
efficiency grounds but also based on concerns of reasonableness and of fairness-
related dimensions. 
5. CONCLUSION 
As a conclusion, a “pure” effects-based approach (in a narrow Chicagoan meaning) 
may not be optimal to manage abuses of economic power. While a better option may 
involve the integration of modern IO tools, their complexity and their inability to 
provide clear-cut and valid results, regardless of the case and the circumstances, are 
problematic. A rule-based approach with theory-driven, rebuttable presumptions 
protecting economic-dependent players might be a valuable second best option. Even 
if a per se rule never leads to an initial best result, it might be a reasonable way to 
reduce the prospects of abusing economic power considering the difficulties in 
characterizing such abuses and the risk of irreversible competitive damages.33 In order 
to avoid the pitfalls of such an approach,34 it may be reasonable in specific cases to 
favor the implementation of an effects-based approach, but allocating the burden of 
evidence to the powerful players.  
Nevertheless, two dimensions have to be kept in mind. The first is symmetrical to 
the difficulty for plaintiffs in characterizing anticompetitive conducts. We have to 
consider the risk that the defendants may engage in cherry-picking among economic 
                                                            
33 The US DoJ 2008 report also considers that per se illegality rules may make sense in terms of 
optimizing administrative costs of the competition law enforcement agency “when experience with 
conduct establishes that it is always or almost sufficiently pernicious to that it should be condemned, 
without inquiry into its actual effects in each case” (p.17). However, such a rule grounded in experience 
cannot be accepted in the case of emerging markets, nor with digital ones. 
34 See the US Supreme Court Brown Shoe decision (Brown Shoe Co. Inc v. United States, 370 US 294, 
1962) as a counterexample. 
 32
models, searching for a pro-competitive explanation of their market behavior. The 
debates related to the platform economy (and the criticisms leveled against two-sided 
approach results as an easy way to find efficiency-enhancing rationales for 
anticompetitive practices35) may be highlighted. The second dimension lies with the 
difficult but necessary objective to comply with fairness expectations of society (and 
not of individuals). Competition law enforcement is not only a matter of technique but 
is mainly an expression of a social choice among different efficiency – distribution 
pairs that are seen as reasonable to society. The role of legal rules (e.g., institutions) is 
to balance the different values and objectives to find such an equilibrium. A 
comprehensive competition economics approach, embracing not only IO but also 
institutional, behavioral, and evolutionary economics, may create a sound framework 
for competition policy (see Budzinski, 2010, in the context of merger control). 
Finally, even though competition laws aim at protecting competition and not 
competitors,36 they may address the concentration of economic power and they 
should counteract contractual unbalances among heterogeneous firms in terms of 
market power in order to prevent undue wealth transfers or irreversible competitive 
damages. 
Considering the arguments against the integration of economic dependence 
concerns in competition law enforcement is very interesting from an economic point 
of view. Some arguments rely on Chicagoan-based views according to which taking 
into account any criterion other than consumer welfare may yield judicial uncertainties 
that are ultimately detrimental to final consumers. We have stressed that such a 
position may lead to false negative decisions and limit economic concerns to 
efficiency, by considering fairness or reasonability as a non-economic dimension. A 
second set of arguments leads to the proposition that such issues could be addressed 
by civil courts, which are better equipped than competition authorities to deal with 
contractual disputes. Again, such a view is relevant to the extent that vertical 
                                                            
35 See Aueur and Petit (2015). 
36 See the US Supreme Court in Brunswick Corp v Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat Inc., 429 US 477, 488, 1977. 
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restrictions have no horizontal consequences on the downstream market. The 
difficulty is to reconcile sound economics-based competition law enforcement with 
sanctions for vertical abuses that may lead to competitive damage. Jenny (2008) 
suggests several avenues to explore how a competition authority may take charge of 
this issue: 
- Considering mainly objective or ex ante dependencies 
- Assessing the damages for suppliers if the threat is exerted by the coercer before 
deciding to intervene 
- Conditioning the intervention to cases that potentially induce significant 
negative externalities in the downstream market 
- Taking into consideration the fact that when the coercer enjoys upstream 
market power, its coercion by its downstream partner may be welfare 
enhancing. 
However, this promising roadmap does not integrate efficiency-related purposes of 
competition law enforcement regarding the preservation of market access (see 
Bakhoum, 2015) or the promotion of reasonableness in market behaviors (Commons, 
1924). With current social concerns about the role of competition policy, a focus is 
emerging on economic power imbalance and on the growing inequalities produced by 
the market process. A more economic approach must certainly be an effects-based 
approach (even if these effects may be hypothetical at the time of the decision) but 
must not be strictly based on an allocative efficiency approach. In other words, the 
modernization of competition law enforcement should not inexorably involve limiting 
the objective of competition policy to the maximization of total welfare. The more 
economic approach could be extended to order to embrace diversity (Budzinski, 2008). 
As Lamadrid de Pablo (2017) states, fairness is not a standalone purpose but 
constitutes one of the natural outcomes of the competition process, as long as the 
competition policy guarantees undistorted access to the market, ensures a competitive 
rivalry based on the merits, prohibits all types of exploitative abuses, and requires 
undertakings to reserve a fair share of the efficiency gains for the consumer (see for 
 34
instance the concentrations control of the Article 101(3) provisions). In the EU 
Commissioner for Competition Margaret Vestager’s own words, “[...] competition 
enforcement also sends a message of fairness. That's what President Juncker referred 
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